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In addition, Scowcroft predicted dire consequences in the region if the United States struck Iraq.The Middle East, which considers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the most crucial issue, would interpret such an attack as a turning away from that conflict.“This president has a very strong anchor and compass about the direction of foreign policy, about not just what’s right and what’s wrong, but what might work and what might not work,” she said.“I found myself seeing the value of that.” One strong characteristic of Condi and George W. That hope still lights our way, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness will not overcome it.” In a radio address a few days later, the president reiterated his argument that Hussein posed a threat to the world that must be addressed by U. and global intervention: Congress must make it unmistakably clear, when it comes to confronting the growing danger posed by Iraq’s efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction, that the status quo is totally unacceptable.When the British report was found to be a forgery, Condi was forced to admit on on June 8, 2003, that “clearly, that particular report, we learned subsequently, subsequently, was not credible.” On February 24, the Bush administration and two allies, Great Britain and Spain, attempted to make this urgency official by proposing a U. resolution that stated that “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441.” In response, France, Germany, and Russia drafted their own resolution calling for more inspection time.“The military option should only be a last resort,” stated the draft, which argued that the conditions for using force against Iraq “are not fulfilled.” The day that both of these draft resolutions were submitted, Condi reiterated the president’s call for swift action in dealing with Hussein.When France, Germany, and Russia announced that they would not join the coalition in the spring of 2003, her reaction was sharp and strident.She referred to their policy as “non-nein-nyet,” and stated that the U. strategy should be to “punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia.” This hard-line position contrasted with the more moderate, Scowcroft-like foreign policy perspective Condi had spelled out in her article in January 2000.
Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, omitted the uranium story from his presentation to the United Nations in February 2003, explaining later that he did not think the evidence was substantial enough to announce.
“I know that, had we thought that therewas an attack coming in Washington or New York, we would have movedheaven and earth to try and stop it. The following August, Condi spelled out the president’s perspective on Saddam Hussein in a widely quoted BBC interview.
And I know that there was no single thingthat might have prevented that attack.” magazine affirmed this standing in August by naming her number one in its list of “The World’s Most Powerful Women.” The magazine announced that “advising the leader of the world’s largest superpower—and having the ear of leaders around the globe—makes Rice, 49, the most powerful woman in the world.” Although Condi had become well known as one of the most visible national security advisors in history, the primary factor behind her increased global familiarity from 2002 onward has been the war in Iraq. Speaking to BBC Radio 4, she stated that the Iraqi leader “is an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own population, his neighbors and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, on all of us.” Her argument stressed that there was a “very powerful moral case” for removing Hussein from power, based on lessons from history.
Writing about the 12,200-page declaration that Iraq had submitted to the United Nations about its weapons program, Condi stated that the document “fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get uranium from abroad.” The question of Iraq’s purchase of uranium from Niger had been investigated by the CIA and the State Department, both of which concluded that the attempts to buy this material could not be confirmed.
The evidence was so scant that the CIA urged Great Britain to drop references to this alleged event in a dossier it published in the fall of 2002.